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Abstract 
Nearly two decades since its inception, the Transitional Mechanism of the Nile 
Basin Initiative (NBI) has been credited for fulfilling several components of its 
institutional undertaking –building an atmosphere of trust and dialogue among 
riparian states. Yet, the negotiations pursued under the auspices of the NBI 
have failed to realize one of organization’s most fundamental missions: 
establishing a permanent legal framework and institution ‘acceptable’ to all 
states across the basin. The diplomatic enterprise leading to the adoption of the 
Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework (CFA) was beset 
by multifaceted challenges. I argue that in spite of the unparalleled heights in 
cooperative dialogues that were largely depicted as a ‘political triumph’ from 
upstream perspective, the legal and hydro–political discourse leading to the 
CFA’s final framing failed to mollify the ‘expectations’ of two key stake–
holding states: Egypt and Sudan. This preordained an existential threat to the 
institutional future of the NBI itself and the noble objectives it sought to 
realize.  All the same, the organizational predicament in the basin also evinced 
that the Nile riparian states have little choice but to revive the ‘dwindling’ 
momentum and ensure that the NBI’s undertaking is concluded in an 
‘inclusive’ and ‘equitable’ manner. Else, this author submits, the alternative 
would not only present a bleak future from the point of view of cooperation and 
optimum development of the Nile resources, over the long range, it also stifles 
the basin states’ enduring riverine interests.  
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Organized as a sequel to the studies published in Mizan 8(2) and 9(2) focusing 
on legal history of the Nile (1902–2013),1 this article reconstructs in 
multidisciplinary investigation fundamentals of the political and legal setting of 
the processes leading to the adoption of the ‘Agreement on the Nile River Basin 
Cooperative Framework’ (CFA) in 2010,2 and endeavors to foster a critical 
understanding of why the NBI/CFA schemes stalled in the post–2010 period. 
Working on a gradual transformation of riparian cooperation in the region, the 
first section presents on milestone collaborative measures espoused by the basin 
states since the early 1990’s –following on the Nile-2002 Conference Series 
pursued under the auspices of the TECCONILE, and eventually, the NBI. 
 Section 2 submits details of the negotiations history on the CFA, the core 
challenges and key achievements of the ‘Panel of Experts’, the ‘Transitional 
Committee’ and the ‘Negotiations Committee’ in pursuing works on the drafts 
and formal structuring of the CFA, and the polarized debates that extended to 
date over certain aspects of the CFA. Section 3 deals with stalled processes of 
the NBI in relation to the CFA –discussing the concentrated efforts, actions and 
counteractions adopted by the basin states, and it highlights the ramifications of 
the ‘fractured’ enterprise which detracted the CFA’s chances from becoming a 
comprehensive legal instrument.  
The fourth section discusses the most contentious legal issues ‘addressed’ 
under the CFA –focusing on three themes: the characterization of the 
‘international watercourse’ conception, ‘water security and the fate of pre–
existing uses/rights’ and the exchange of ‘information concerning planned 
measures’. The last section dwells on the analyses of key factors that accounted 
for the NBI’s ‘less promising future’ as a collective institutional platform, and it 
examines whether, in light of the contemporary circumstances, the NBI’s overall 
undertaking and the CFA itself could be read as ‘failing enterprises’ impacting 
the organization’s efficiency and sustainability.  
                                           
1 See: Tadesse Kassa Woldetsadik (2014), ‘The Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty on the Nile and the 
Tana Dam Concessions: A Script in Legal History of Ethiopia’s Diplomatic Confront 
(1900-1956)’, 8.2Mizan Law Review, pp.271–298; and ‘The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance 
Dam and Ethiopia’s Succession in Hydro–legal Prominence: A Script in Legal History of 
Diplomatic Confront (1957-2013)’, 9.2 Mizan Law Review, pp.373–411. 
2 On 13 April 2010, an Extraordinary Meeting of the Nile–Council of Ministers (Nile-COM) 
held in Sharm El Sheikh passed a resolution to proceed, at a later date, with a formal 
signature of the CFA; the document was opened for signature in Entebbe, Uganda, from 14 
May 2010 for a period of not more than one year.  
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1. The Advent of a Cooperative Exercise under the Nile Basin 
Initiative  
Since the early 1990’s, the Nile River basin witnessed milestone cooperative 
steps –steadily transforming the legal and political setting of cooperation in the 
region. Consultative forums had already been organized since 1993 under the 
auspices of the ‘Nile–2002 Conference’ series. Alternately hosted by riparian 
countries, the conventions worked as ‘venting spaces’ –congregating politicians, 
legal scholars, technical experts, non-governmental organizations, stake-holding 
institutions and academics to converse and exchange views on the legal, socio–
economic, political and institutional aspects of basin–wide cooperation, 
regulation and management of the Nile River water resources.3 
From 1993 to 2002, the annual conferences were held under the umbrella of 
the Technical Cooperation Committee for the Promotion of the Development 
and Environmental Protection of the Nile Basin (TECCONILE) –an institutional 
platform established in 1993.4 The themes of deliberation of the series were 
diverse –coalescing technical, political, legal and developmental studies 
presented by national and international experts; the thematic concentrations 
covered issues relating to national water resources management plans, 
opportunities for cooperative management of the Nile water resources through 
permanent legal and institutional frameworks, and the challenges faced in 
coordinating national schemes with the broader outlines for integrated use and 
management of the Nile River water resources. 
2. Negotiations on the Cooperative Framework Agreement  
The outcome of the Nile-2002 proceedings was generally progressive. The 
platforms stimulated further cooperation and provoked thoughts about 
instituting permanent operational models through an inclusive organizational 
arrangement and regulatory framework for equitable and sustainable utilization 
of the Nile. In February 1995, the Nile-COM undertook the first crucial step in 
this direction –adopting the Nile River Basin Action Plan with support of the 
Canada International Development Agency (CIDA)– which comprised about 
                                           
3 For more detailed treatment of the historical and political processes leading to the 
establishment of the Nile Basin Initiative itself, please refer to: Ashok Swain (1997), 
‘Ethiopia, the Sudan, and Egypt: The Nile River Dispute’ 35.4 The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, pp.690-694; The Nile Basin Initiative (Nov.2013), ‘Cooperation on the 
Nile’, DEV COM Publications, Serial No.01, p3-5. 
4 It was formally launched following a Nile–COM resolution adopted in Kampala in 1992 as 
initiative to promote cooperation and development in the basin; it involved the DRC, 
Sudan, Egypt, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania. Ethiopia held an observer status.  
  Nile Basin Initiative, http://www.nilebasin.org/index.php/about-us/nile-basin-initiative  
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twenty-two projects;5 the scheme was endorsed during the Nile-COM’s third 
meeting in Arusha. Among others, the plan authorized work on the Nile River 
Basin Cooperative Framework (originally labelled as ‘Project D-3’) which 
proposed to establish a new platform for cooperative utilization of the resource. 
Implementation on the action plan’s key objective of establishing a forum for 
legal and institutional dialogue began in 1996.6  
The new discourse presented a unique opening for dealing with the complex 
legal and political quandaries involving the Nile, and heralded a new chapter 
founded on dialogue, cooperation and trust. In May 1996, the fourth Nile-2002 
conference reconfirmed the political commitment of the basin states, and in the 
same year, a Panel of Experts (PoE) was constituted for the task –composed of 
three appointed members from each riparian state. By 1997, the Nile-COM 
partnered with the CIDA, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
and the World Bank –the latter furthermore entrusted with the task of ‘leading 
and coordinating’ donor activities to support the establishment of a basin-wide 
consultative mechanism that expedites the realization of this objective. By this 
time, a second meeting of the Nile-TAC, established in March 1998, had 
approved proposals for the ‘Nile Basin Initiative Policy Guidelines’ and a ‘Plan 
of Action Establishing the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)’. In February 1999, the 
overall platform for dialogue evolved and the whole process was immersed into 
the mandates of the new ‘Transitional Institutional Mechanism of the Nile Basin 
Initiative’. 
Hence, more streamlined negotiations followed within the framework of the 
NBI –the first truly comprehensive cooperative enterprise on the Nile; it was 
formally established on 22 February 1999 through the Agreed Minutes on the 
NBI –adopted and signed by nine basin states.7 Launching its operational base 
from Entebbe in June 1999 and conferred with legal personality and a fitting 
diplomatic status three years later,8 the provisional diplomatic initiative worked 
towards attaining the ‘Shared Vision’ program whose core objectives have been 
‘to achieve sustainable socio–economic development through equitable 
utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile basin water resources’.9 In this 
                                           
5 Nile Basin Initiative (May 2001), ‘Shared Vision Program, Nile Transboundary 
Environmental Action’, Draft Gef Project Brief, May 2001,  Council of Ministers of Water 
Affairs of the Nile Basin States, p. 2. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Agreed Minutes of the Extraordinary Meeting of Nile Basin Council of Ministers, Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania (1999) 
8 The Nile Basin Initiative Act (2002), Act to give the force of law to the Agreed Minute 
No.7 of the 9th Annual Meeting of the Nile Basin States held in Cairo, Egypt on 14th 
February 2002. 
9 Nile Basin Initiative (Nov.2013), ‘Cooperation on the Nile’, DEV COM Publications, 
Serial No.01. 
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spirit, the NBI was extended with three chief functions: facilitating a basin 
cooperation, water resources management, and water resources development. 
Continuing the initiative with a view to setting in place the ‘Nile River Basin 
Commission’ and the ‘Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement’, 
too, constituted the NBI’s central undertakings.  
In essence, the new initiative sought to annul all pre–existing legal 
arrangements, including colonial-epoch treaties that restricted the Nile River’s 
use upstream, and to structure a comprehensive legal instrument that ensures 
equal access and equitable uses across the basin. Yet, the basin states differed on 
the specific approaches that should be adopted in this regard and espoused 
contrasting positions in relation to the fate of the ‘status quo’. Indeed, during the 
negotiations, the charge of accommodating under the CFA the seething conflict 
between ‘pre–existing arrangements’ and ‘current rights of utilization’ remained 
the most daunting challenge –hampering the whole diplomatic process in the 
subsequent years.10  
Since January 1997, a Panel of Experts was commissioned to work on a draft 
CFA. The Panel submitted an agreed upon framework to the Nile–COM 
meeting in August 2000. Reinforced by a partnership convention of the 
‘International Consortium for Cooperation on the Nile’ held in Geneva to 
further dialogue on collaboration and development in the basin (June–2001), a 
‘Transitional Committee’ operating under the auspices of the NBI was 
constituted to complete the PoE’s undertaking to fruition; its missions included 
offering solutions to lingering issues that required riparian convergence and to 
pursue works on the formal structuring of the CFA document. The Committee 
produced the CFA’s first draft in August 2001.11 However, unresolved matters 
remained leading to protracted dialogues in the hands of the ‘Negotiations 
Committee’.12 
With riparian stakes so high and national approaches divergent, the basin 
states endeavored for four more years to draw a charter that composes riparian 
rights and regulates the cooperative use of the river. From 2003 to 2005, the 
Negotiations Committee deliberated on a draft produced by the Transitional 
Committee, and resolved nearly all the outstanding matters. Yet, in March 2005, 
the Nile–COM’s meeting in Addis Ababa failed to take a decision on final text 
                                           
10 Tadesse Kassa Woldetsadik (2015) ‘Remodeling sovereignty: overtures of a new water 
security paradigm in the Nile basin legal discourse’, eds. Sovereignty and the Development 
of International Water Law, Volume 8: A History of Water Series III, A.B Tauris, London 
/ New York pp.646-647. 
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of the document; this was due to unresolved issues relating to the fate of ‘pre–
existing uses/agreements’ and how best to address such a juridical draw through 
the provision of alternative stipulation on ‘water security’; as the polarized 
debate extended over the years without proffering any solution, a provision on 
water security ‘proposed’ by the World Bank was introduced as a conceptual 
middle –ground to salvage the cooperative enterprise.13  
Novel and ambiguous as it was, the new concept, which had been floating 
since 2005, was referred to additional scrutiny on the basis of a request tabled 
by Ethiopia. Again, the overall task on the CFA draft was deferred to the 
political process of the ministers and submitted with alternative texts for a 
meeting in Kigali in February 2007; the meeting dropped an earlier version of 
Article 14.b – a subject broadly addressed in Section 4.2 below – and resolved 
to settle on the stipulation in its present form under the CFA. 
In June 2007, the Nile-COM, the highest decision-making organ of the NBI, 
finalized in Uganda negotiations on the substantive and procedural aspects of 
the CFA, concluding its rigorous deliberations that stretched from March 2006 
to June 2007. Again, all but one provision of the CFA were agreed upon; the 
contentious clause was referred to the respective heads of states of the riparian 
states,14 and yet, no resolution was dispensed. While beset by a few outstanding 
issues, this historical episode closed a painstaking decade-long diplomatic 
initiative that drove user-right dialogues in the basin to unprecedented heights.15 
3. A Stalled Process: Actions and Counteractions on the CFA  
While a measure of flexibility had been witnessed in riparian positions of the 
basin states and it is true that the political process laboring on attaining equitable 
utilization of the Nile waters was charged by enthusiastic ambience, in the final 
phases of 2007, negotiations on the CFA stalled. Fiery debates over Article 14.b 
on water security continued; by this time, it appeared the bargaining process had 
‘exhausted’ all offers that could have been provided to arrive at a mutually 
pleasing settlement. In 2008, several failed attempts followed to realign 
positions, and in the end, seven upstream states broke the gridlock. On 22 May 
2009, an Extra–Ordinary Meeting of the Nile–COM in Kinshasa readied a final 
text and proposed to open the CFA for signature at a designated date.16 Against 
the backdrop of a drawn-out process and stalemate, a resolution by the 
‘upstream bloc’ decided to ‘annex’ the contentious provision to the main text so 
                                           
13 Elaborate discussions on the concept of water security and its structure under Art.14 of the 
CFA are provided in Section 4.2 below. 
14 Nile Basin Initiative, note 11. 
15 Tadesse Kassa Woldetsadik (2015), supra note 10, p.647. 
16 Nile Basin Initiative, supra note 11. 
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that the matter would be addressed by subsequent decision of a permanent 
institution –the Nile River Basin Commission (NRBC)– if and when it is 
established under the CFA.  
Unsurprisingly, Egypt protested against the ‘unilateral’ move, which, it 
contended, deviated from the modalities applied under previous proceedings 
leading to Nile–COM’s resolution in 2007; it held that hitherto ‘key’ provisions 
of the draft were accepted only by ‘consensus’ and others through ‘majority 
decisions’ –a position which generally mirrored the amendment procedures 
specified under Article 35 of the CFA’s final text.17 On the other hand, Sudan’s 
delegation –led by Minister Kamal Ali Mohammed– questioned the competence 
of the assembly to address issues related to the ‘signing’ of the CFA before the 
document was submitted to the heads of states; hence, Sudan, not present when 
the Nile–COM’s decision was eventually taken, joined hands with Egypt to 
register objections.18  
The treaty’s future as a ‘basin-wide platform’ looked doomed as both states 
championed positions on the basis of ‘water security’ postulate which embraces 
the CFA only in a context that warrants non-interference with ‘established’ 
rights. In essence, the countering approach by downstream states strove to 
restore the ‘zero–sum’ policy which had been employed in the past, and hence 
‘confine’ the resource’s utilization to preexisting uses erected along the lower 
stretches of the river. The fact remains, however, that the Nile, the longest river 
in the world, is endowed with a very limited water flows regime relative to 
population; the basin states will inevitably face serious challenges to sustain the 
‘historical shares’ of downriver communities and simultaneously cater for 
‘future irrigational water requirements’ of the upriver population –unless more 
waters could be availed through wide ranging conservation works.  
It states the obvious to recount that at this stage the cooperative process was 
overwhelmed by formidable contests. The legal and political ramification of a 
‘fractured initiative’ was clear, and the basin states had sensed the predicament. 
This triggered the launch of intensive basin-wide conventions in the post-2009 
period hoping to achieve three objectives: mending the outstanding differences, 
paying respect to Egypt’s request for temporary deferment, and unifying riparian 
positions through extended consultations.  
                                           
17 Article 35 on the Amendment of the CFA provided that Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 14 (on 
water security), 23, 24, 33, and 34 may be amended only by consensus. As to proposed 
amendments to other articles or to any protocol, the Parties shall make every effort to reach 
agreement by consensus. If all efforts to arrive at consensus have been exhausted, and no 
agreement is reached, the amendment shall as a last resort be adopted by a two-thirds 
majority vote of the State Parties to the instrument in question present and voting at the 
meeting. 
18 Nile Basin Initiative, supra note 8. 
The Nile Basin Initiative and the Comprehensive Framework Agreement…                       203 
 
 
Following the Nile-COM’s meeting in Alexandria (July 2009), a resolution 
was adopted to pass-over the task to the Nile-TAC and the Negotiations 
Committee. The two institutional platforms would not only work on the 
unsettled matters within six months, but would also submit recommendation on 
installing an inclusive mechanism under the CFA and facilitate the CFA’s 
conclusion as a legal instrument that transforms the NBI into a permanent 
institution of the NRBC. New rounds of political and technical meetings of the 
Nile-COM and the Nile Technical Advisory and Negotiators Committees (Nile-
TAC) were therefore held in Entebbe (September 2009) and Dar es Salam 
(December 2009). Still, Egypt and Sudan failed to reconcile their positions with 
the Nile-COM’s proposal endorsed in Kinshasa.  
As the protracted deliberations and diplomatic pressures directed at Egypt 
and Sudan yielded no results, the upstream states realized that they had no 
choice but to resort to the next move: opening the CFA for signature. In ironic 
happenstance, a ground-breaking resolution that called for the abolishment of 
the old uses regime in the basin was eventually proclaimed in Egypt itself. In 
spite of the outstanding differences in riparian positions, on 13 April 2010, an 
Extraordinary Meeting of the Nile–COM held in Sharm el Sheikh resolved to 
proceed at a designated date with a formal signature of the CFA.19 Egypt and 
Sudan not only rejected the move for the opening of the CFA’s signature, the 
former also directed attention to procedures of negotiation – -reproving upper 
riparian states of ‘violating the rules agreed upon in the Nile Basin Initiative 
which stated that decisions should be taken by consensus, not by majority’. In 
remonstration, Minister Mohamed Nasreddin Allam proclaimed Egypt ‘will not 
sign any deal before its conditions are met’ which included that ‘all decisions 
are to be finalized unanimously, and not through majority vote’.20 
Consequently, the CFA opened for signature in Entebbe, Uganda, from 14 
May 2010 for a period of not more than one year.21 Against Egypt’s proposal 
and declared anticipation that ‘upstream countries (would) reverse their decision 
to sign a unilateral framework agreement so that negotiations continue’,22 the 
treaty has since been signed by six states. Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania and 
Uganda signed the CFA on the opening day; Kenya followed suit on 19 May 
2010 and Burundi on 28 February 2011. The Republic of South Sudan was 
admitted to the NBI in July 2012; it declared plans to sign the CFA in spite of 
the unsettled questions involving ‘succession’ of the 1929/1959 Nile waters 
                                           
19 Nile Basin Initiative (14 April 2010), ‘Ministers of Water Affairs End Extraordinary 
Meeting Over the Cooperative Framework Agreement’, Press Release.  
20 Al Ahram Online (22–28 April 2010), ‘Danger on the Nile’, Issue No. 995. 
21 Nile Basin Initiative (14 May 2010), ‘Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative 
Framework Opened for Signature’, Press Release.  
22 Al Ahram Online (22–28 April 2010), supra note 20. 
204                             MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 11, No.1                              September 2017  
 
 
treaties, hence generally furthering the vigor of the negotiations in favor of the 
‘upstream bloc’.  
The CFA would enter into force on the sixtieth day following the date of 
deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification or accession with the African 
Union.23 The moral, political and legal implications of the CFA, should it enter 
into force, were clearly noted. In varying scales of success, both riparian ‘blocs’ 
labored in intense diplomacy to achieve incompatible ends by making use of the 
CFA.  
Coincidentally, as the wave of demonstrations of the Arab Spring revolution 
took root in 2011, Egypt slipped into chaos and political turbulence. The post–
Mubarak provisional government was greatly preoccupied with domestic 
concerns to pursue a robust and consistent riparian policy that influences the 
discourse on the CFA. In distraction, therefore, Egypt resorted to a high-profile 
diplomatic drive ‘appealing’ for delays in the ratification of the CFA across the 
Nile basin states –pending the constitution of a ‘duly mandated’ civilian 
government. A request tabled by the ‘Egyptian Public Diplomacy’ was formally 
accepted by Ethiopia, the chief proponent of the CFA and equitable utilization 
of the Nile waters across the basin.24 
Yet, Egypt’s ‘first-ever’ democratic election which brought Mohammed 
Morsi to the helm of the new political order in June 2012 proffered little 
initiative to restrain the contrasting approaches; nor did it strive to narrow down 
the grave upstream-downstream divide espoused under a ‘water security’ frame. 
Worse, a serious setback to the CFA constituting a platform that includes Egypt 
came about in June 2013 –following a tense diplomatic altercation and fallout 
between itself and Ethiopia in reaction to the latter’s construction of the Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile.25 Against the background 
of depressed diplomatic relations, Ethiopia’s House of People’s Representatives 
took the first historic move ratifying the CFA on 13 June 2013; it was followed 
by Rwanda (August–2013) and Tanzania (March–2015), initiating the formal 
transformation of the NBI into a permanent Nile River Basin Commission 
(NRBC) . 
                                           
23 Art. 42 of the CFA. 
24 Ethiopian Television, Interview with PM Meles Zenawi on the GERD, uploaded on 
YouTube 17 May 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d5CTbpnUeOY 
25 Implementation on the GERD started in 2011; the project, one of the biggest hydropower 
infrastructures in the world in terms of installed capacity, is situated at Guba in the 
Benishangul–Gumuz regional state. It comprises a dam about 1,780 m long and 145 m 
high, and will host a power plant with an installed generating capacity of 6,000 MW. The 
dam will create Ethiopia’s largest artificial lake impounding 74 billion m3 of the Blue Nile 
flows – nearly half the gross volume at the Lake Nasser Reservoir – and has a total surface 
area of 1,680 km2. 
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In tandem with the CFA’s adoption, the ‘interim’ institution of the NBI 
began preparations for its own structural evolution. In February 2010, it 
launched a project on Institutional Design Study to ‘identify and clarify future 
institutional options for the NBI in the transition to a river basin organization’.26 
The NBI also took measures with a view to setting a foundation for works of the 
new commission and its multifaceted tasks through which the remaining issues 
on the CFA would be resolved.27 The abysmal pace at which the NBI’s 
development programs have been implemented had caused concern in many 
quarters, and if any, the challenges encountered in its institutional processes had 
demonstrated the imperatives of speedily launching a permanent institution –the 
NRBC. The NRBC would nurture the NBI’s gains, but most importantly, it is 
would steer basin-wide water resource development initiatives in more 
meaningful ways –by coordinating and harmonizing national and regional 
policies and actions. Today, in spite of the strong diplomatic momentum and 
promising developments in the early stages of the cooperative enterprise, the 
treaty remains restrained by serious problems –detracting its chances of ever 
becoming a truly comprehensive legal instrument.  
In legal response to upstream bloc’s resolve, Egypt warned sternly that any 
decision held at the Extra-Ordinary Meeting of the Nile-COM ‘reflects the 
views only of the states.’28 Its Minister, Mohamed Nasreddin Allam, reiterated 
‘Egypt will not sign any deal before its conditions are met’; and however 
framed, the ‘Nile Cooperative Framework Agreement must clearly recognize 
Egypt and Sudan’s historic share of the Nile waters’.29 An alternative proposal 
for direct launching of the NRBC ‘within the framework of which further 
negotiations on the remaining pieces of the CFA would be undertaken’ failed to 
garner an upstream favor.30  
Overwhelmed by uncertainties on how best to safeguard national riverine 
interests, Egypt and Sudan weighed on the virtues of staying in an institutional 
initiative which, they claimed, had failed to recognize historical rights and 
allowed upriver appropriation of the Nile waters without their prior consent. To 
counter the Nile-COM’s Sharm el Sheik resolution, presidents Hosni Mubarak 
                                           
26 Nile Basin Initiative (March 2011), A Quarterly Newsletter of the Nile Basin Initiative, 
Volume 8, Issue 1. 
27 Al–Monitor (27 March 2015), ‘Will Egypt seek Nile River agreement with upstream 
countries?’ Interview with John Rao Nyaoro, Executive Director of the Nile Basin 
Initiative.  
28 Nile Basin Initiative (14 April 2010), supra note 19. 
29 Al Ahram Online (22-28 April 2010), supra note 20. 
30 Tadesse Kassa Woldetsadik (2013), International Watercourses Law in the Nile Basin, 
Three States at a Crossroads, Earthscan Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 
Oxfordshire, United Kingdom, p.165. 
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and Omar Al-Bashir dispatched diplomatic messages to heads of states of the 
Nile riparian countries ‘to open the door for a new round of negotiations’.31 This 
latest exercise was attended by a little successful visit of Egypt’s Foreign 
Minister Ahmed Abul-Gheit ‘to three Nile Basin countries’.32 However, the new 
legal trajectory evolving in the basin was too robust to reverse; in consequence, 
Egypt and Sudan decided to ‘freeze’ their involvement in the NBI –shortly after 
upstream states ventured to sign the CFA in 2010.  
Sudan reactivated its membership in the NBI in 2013, but Egypt would not 
resume participation until February 2015 –when it ‘reevaluated the situation in 
light of developments in the scene’33 and dispatched to Sudan its long-absent 
ministerial delegation led by Hossam Moghazi on the occasion of the sixteenth 
anniversary of the NBI and annual celebrations of the Nile Day.  
Egypt’s rediscovered traction to the NBI’s common visions, it was 
pronounced, was a reaction to the ‘need for maintaining a collective and all-
inclusive movement of the Nile Basin countries under one framework’. Yet, 
Egypt and Sudan persevered to view the NBI’s core missions and its 
preoccupation with the CFA on equitable uses of the Nile waters only in a 
context that does ‘not affect’ prior uses and rights. Such a restricted approach on 
issues of common riparian welfare impelled serious doubts regarding their 
commitment to sovereign equality and the fundamental objectives which the 
NBI itself upholds.  
Despite such a gloomy background, though, this period also witnessed 
positive developments; Egypt’s unofficial comeback to the NBI’s consultative 
forums could be read as a step forward towards full reengagement. In the same 
year also, the Nile-COM meeting held in Khartoum focused on hammering 
outstanding issues of the basin-wide legal framework. Already pressed by 
concentrated negotiations with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance 
Dam (GERD), Egypt seemed to realize that it could not safeguard its riverine 
interests by ‘staying away’ from the NBI’s cooperative platform.   
Still, Egypt continued to flout upstream plans under the CFA, and further 
declared that it would not accept the CFA in its current form – while 
accentuating that such differences shouldn’t ‘hinder cooperation’ between the 
riparian states. If it may be perplexing from purely legal perspective, 
‘reopening’ negotiations on the CFA looked a more inevitable course; in fact, in 
the latest rounds, such agenda seemed to have found favor with a few upstream 
countries. On its part, Egypt, too, stressed it had already ‘presented its views 
                                           
31 Al Ahram Online (22-28 April 2010), supra note 20. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Egynews.net (22 Feb.2015), ‘The 16th anniversary of the Nile Basin Initiative: Egypt back 
after an absence’. 
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about the required amendments on certain items of the Entebbe Agreement’ so 
as to patch the upstream-downstream divide, and hoped the ‘coming period will 
witness further moves to solve all the unresolved or pending issues.’34 In the 
subsequent processes, however, Egypt’s passive envelopment and disruptive 
effects of ‘renegotiating’ the treaty drew pale optimism over the prospect that 
downstream states would ever endorse the CFA. 
Six years since adoption in 2010, the CFA’s entry into force thus continued 
to face a bleak future –because of different reasons. Kenya and Uganda, two of 
the stiffest players initiating the drive against pre-existing treaties, renegaded on 
repeated pledges for immediate ratifications; DR Congo –a country with the 
least geographical expanse and water contribution in the basin next only to 
Eritrea –remained unenthusiastic, and in fact, in 2016, the Congolese P.M. 
Augustin M. Ponyo reportedly declared support for Egypt in relation to the 
dispute over the GERD.35 Burundi’s position continued to be ambiguous, and 
the Republic of South Sudan –the latest entry into the club, has yet to sign the 
CFA document.  
The behavioral trail of the riparian states swerved uncertainly, revealing 
inconsistencies in the political and developmental agenda which each state had 
pursued through its participation in the NBI. While a few, with embedded 
stakes, contended with pressing calls for equitable utilization of the resource to 
satisfy the irrigational, hydro–power and developmental needs of their 
communities, others, accounting for a smaller proportion of the river’s overall 
floods, remained unconcerned in the political discourse or preferred to dwell on 
technical matters of water resources management –including ecological 
preservation, hydrology, meteorology and systematic monitoring the state of the 
river. Slowly, therefore, the momentum of riparian cooperation on the scales 
anticipated under the NBI paled. Instead, the weight of the legal and diplomatic 
rendezvous ‘shifted’ to the trilateral negotiations of the ‘Eastern Nile Basin 
states’ – a fact obviously prompted by a new resource development enterprise 
on the Blue Nile segment in Ethiopia.  
To summarize, while the cooperative spirit under the NBI remained 
unprecedented and the political implication of the undertaking has been duly 
acknowledged, the initiative and its legal architecture failed to complete the 
running course. Legally, too, the CFA tended to create an unviable regime that 
potentially applies only as between the upriver states –with little chances of 
Egypt (and Sudan) accepting the treaty in its present form. As late as in 2015, 
                                           
34 Al Ahram Weekly (26 Feb.2015), ‘Unresolved matters’, Issue No.1235. 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/10570/17/Unresolved-matters.aspx 
35 Al Ahram Online (4 Feb. 2016),  ‘Congo supports Egypt on Ethiopian dam issue: Prime 
minister’ http://english.ahram.org.eg/WriterArticles/Ahram-Online/344/0.aspx   
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Minister Hossam Moghazi reaffirmed his country’s unswerving policy –that 
Egypt still rejects the CFA and would not endeavor to be its part without 
substantive modifications.36 Given the fundamental variations in national 
approaches of the basin states, it appeared as though the basin-wide legal 
architecture had been preordained to fail from the outset.   
4. Contentious Matters under the CFA 
Within the NBI, Egypt and Sudan endeavored to orient their national water use 
policies in an international context. Such approach has been enthused by two 
fundamental causes: first, a rational assessment that only closer socio–economic 
and basin-wide collaboration guarantees stable water utilizations regime. 
Without a cooperative regulation, unilateralism reigns, which often is attended 
by uncoordinated uses of different actors across the basin –conceivably, in 
environments of tension and conflict. The second factor is related to the 
progressive development and codification of international watercourses law 
regime itself which already relegated all discernments of ‘unfettered 
sovereignty’ over transboundary waters. Not many states wish to stand in the 
open advocating ‘obsolete’ principles of international law that had long ceased 
to regulate riparian relationships. 
Today, more than ever, riparian cooperation remains imperative undertaking 
for a harmonious, sustainable and equitable development of the Nile water 
resources, and no state seems to harbor any illusion on this subject. Yet, the 
bargaining process had always been a very intricate commission –both at the 
political, legal and technical levels. If anything else, the extended talks that led 
to the CFA validate this assertion; clearly, the fundamentals that informed 
riparian perspectives radiated from unrelated national policies, geographical and 
climatic considerations, and narrow perceptions of legal entitlements. 
Against such background, the fact that the basin states echoed support for 
conflicting approaches or endeavored to promote positions through ‘cautious 
interpretation’ of various principles of international watercourses law was only 
natural. In fact, the lengthy codifications process of the UN Watercourses 
Convention itself, lasting from 1970 to 1994, would seem to present a perfect 
parallel to the quandaries faced during the negotiations on the CFA.37 The 
                                           
36 Al Ahram Online (18 Dec.2015), ‘Egypt still rejects Nile Basin’s Cooperative Framework 
Agreement: Irrigation minister’, 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/173843/Egypt/Politics-/Egypt-still-rejects-
Nile-Basins-Cooperative-Framew.aspx 
37 UN Convention on the Non- Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, UN GA 
Resolution, A/Res/51/229, New York, adopted on 21 May 1997, entered into force 17 
August 2014. 
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drafting phases of the Convention saw philological arguments between states 
putting forward varied perspectives on key provisions, including, for instance, 
on the definition of the ‘international watercourse’ conception, the contents and 
relationship between the ‘equitable utilization’ and the ‘obligation not to cause 
significant harm’ principles, on the obligation to ‘regularly exchange data and 
information’, and on the nature of the duty to trade ‘information concerning 
planned measures affecting the condition of an international watercourse’.38  
Two clusters of basin states, respectively spearheaded by Ethiopia and Egypt, 
engaged in intense diplomatic maneuvers to settle vital issues of water-sharing 
and basin-wide regulation of the resource. In varying degrees, three substantive 
matters posed a challenge at different stages of the negotiations process: the 
definition of the ‘international river’ expression, ‘water security’ (later 
juxtaposed with the ‘fate of pre–existing agreements/rights’), and the ‘exchange 
of information concerning planned measures’. All, except one, were eventually 
‘addressed’ in some form and accommodated in the CFA with apparent 
‘consensus’ of all basin states.39 A brief highlight of the key issues raised and 
their evolutionary context is presented below. 
4.1 The characterization of ‘international river’  
The question of how a ‘watercourse’ should be conceived in defining the 
geographical scope over which international law applies had been the subject of 
intense debate during the codification of the UN Watercourses Convention.40 
Hence, it should not come as surprise if the CFA, too, was engulfed by similar 
geographical contests. In this regard, the principal, if not exclusive, question 
related to whether, in regulating the uses and management of transboundary 
rivers, international law applies on a ‘drainage basin’ determined by watershed 
limits of a river or should remain confined to channel waters of a ‘successive or 
                                           
38 For wider account of the International Law Commission’s work on the topics, refer to: 
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, 2 May-
22 July 1994, Official Records of the General Assembly, forty-ninth session, Supplement 
No.10, Document A/49/10, 1994, pp.88-135. 
39 A semblance of unanimity existed giving the impression that the issues under the CFA are 
confined only to Article 14.b. Yet, even as recently as in 2015, Egypt continued to submit 
that the outstanding issues extended beyond – to include, in the words of Minister Hossam 
Moghazi, ‘prior notice, the unanimity condition in the decision making process, and the 
water security in exchange for historical quotas’.  
   Al-Monitor (2015), ‘Despite dam dispute, Egypt seeks to build trust with Ethiopia’ 
  http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/hi/originals/2015/12/egypt-ethiopia-sudan-renaissance-
dam-water-dispute.html 
40 For details, refer to: International Law Commission, Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses: Replies of Governments to the Commission’s questionnaire, 
Document A/CN.4/294 and Add.1, 1976, pp.148-168.  
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contiguous’ river traversing across or forming a boundary between two or more 
states.41  
No doubt, the ‘interdependence’ of different uses and the need for 
‘harmonizing’ activities across a basin for better control and management of 
river resources had been recognized since the days of the so–called ‘fluvial 
irrigation civilizations’ in the Nile, Euphrates, Tigris, Yangtze, Yellow and 
Indus rivers thousands of years ago.42 But, the earliest ‘formal’ thesis of the 
‘drainage basin’ as a physical unit for the application of international law was 
voiced in 1815 by Wilhelm Von Humboldt of Prussia when he submitted, at the 
Congress of Vienna, that a river must be envisaged ‘as a unity’ from its head 
waters to its mouth and be managed as such.43 On the other hand, the opposing 
discourse which could be traced to a definition embodied under ‘Articles I and 
II of the Regulation of 24 March 1815’ and the ‘Final Act of the Congress of 
Vienna of 1815’ characterized an ‘international watercourse’ merely as referring 
to a waterbody which ‘successively’ passes through political territories or 
‘contiguously’ runs along the boundary of two or more states.44  
In upstream–downstream divide, such conceptual exertion has been grounded 
on concerns which a broader definition of a ‘river’ spurs in relation to the 
‘territorial sovereignty’ of riparian states, considerations of functional unity for 
purposes of rational development or ecological preservation notwithstanding. A 
drainage basin, comprising an integrated network of water systems including 
tributaries, sub–tributaries, interlinked surface and groundwater systems, and a 
great deal of the adjoining physical landscapes within a watershed –permits 
greater intrusion into a ‘larger territory’ of basin states, and hence, forms a type 
of ‘dual sovereignty’ over such stretches of land and water bodies. In the Nile 
setting, its application to Ethiopia, an upstream supplier of the largest floods of 
the river, places no less than a third of its landscape and most of its water 
resources under the effective control of international law or basin–wide legal 
arrangement.  
For decades, the treaty practice of states and institutional initiatives of 
international organizations –including the International Law Commission, the 
Institute of International Law and the International Law Association– had 
endeavored to restate a normative dictate on the subject. Despite its vague and 
changing composition under customary international law, a position was 
                                           
41 Tadesse Kassa Woldetsadik (2010), ‘International law and moderations of physical 
geography: the Nile setting’, (eds.) The Currents of Power: Water and the New World 
Order, Terje Tvedt et al., A.B. Tauris, London, New York, p. 473. 
42 Ludwik A. Teclaf (1996), ‘Evolution of the River Basin Concept in National and 
International Law’, 36 Nat. Resources J., p.361 
43 For extensive discussions on the drainage basin concept, refer to: Id., p. 359.   
44 Id., p.479, 483. 
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reiterated under institutional resolutions and declarations –including the UN 
Watercourses Convention,45 which tilted heavily to the ‘drainage basin’ as the 
physical object of international regulation– so far as riparian rights of use are 
concerned. True, in heeding to the divergent views and practices of states, 
Article 2(a) of the UN Watercourses Convention purposely chose not to employ 
any of the rivaling notions (‘drainage basin’ or ‘successive/contiguous river’), 
but in substance, the Convention applies to all aspects of connected river system 
flowing in a basin. Under Article 2(a), a ‘watercourse’ is defined as a system of 
all surface and ground waters constituting a unitary whole and flowing to a 
common terminus. 
The diverse positions which the Nile basin states had espoused during the 
CFA’s drafting were informed by similar theoretical conjectures. Egypt’s 
position on the subject was not only unambiguous, it was also the most extreme, 
introducing a version which received no parallel in the regulatory framework of 
any other basin in the world. It resonates with arguments submitted during 
preparatory deliberations on the UN Watercourses Convention wherein Egypt 
had battled what it considered was a ‘wrong’ employ of the watercourse 
expression under Article 2 by the International Law Commission. As a motion 
was set at the UN General Assembly to endorse the Watercourse Convention, 
Egypt formally registered its protest; it contended an ‘international watercourse’ 
is not inconsistent with the ‘basin of an international river’ –when in fact a 
‘watercourse’ should merely be understood as part of a river basin, and therefore 
the use of this new term cannot under any circumstances affect the rights and 
obligations acquired under bilateral or regional international agreements.46 
Egypt persistently promoted a broader ‘territorial’ concept which 
encompasses every water supply in a basin – including tributaries, feeding 
streams, lakes –and even precipitation falling within a basin. This explains why, 
in its dealings with upstream Nile, Egypt’s former Minister Mohammed Abu–
Zaid argued that in relation to the mean annual flow of the Nile River (84 
BCM), Egypt’s share of 55 BCM per annum under the 1959 Treaty,47 
                                           
45 For example, International Law Association, Report of the 47th Conference held in 
Dubrovnik 1956, London, 1957, pp. 241-243; International Law Association, Report to the 
48th Conference held in New York, 1-7 Sept.1958, London 1959, pp. viii-x; International 
Law Association, Report of the 52nd Conference, Helsinki, 14-20 August 1966, London, 
1967, pp. 484-532; Act Regarding Navigation and Economic Cooperation Between States 
of the Niger Basin, Niamey, 26 Oct.1963 (UN, Treaty Series, vol. 587, No. 8506, p. 9); 
Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems in the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) Region, Johannesburg, 28 August 1995. 
46 United Nations General Assembly Press Release GA/9248; General Assembly Session 51 
Meeting 99, May 21, 1997. Explanation of vote before the vote, Lamia A. Mekhemar 
(Egypt). 
47 Al Ahram Weekly (23 April 2015), ‘Questions about the CFA’,  Issue No.1243.  
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constitutes only 6–8% of the total ‘water resources’ of (about 1600 BCM) which 
the ‘Nile River Basin’ is endowed with.48 As Teclaf explained, while waters of a 
basin system are interconnected and form part of the broader hydrologic cycle 
which begins in the atmosphere and ends in the oceans,49 Egypt’s approach 
which includes all ‘natural precipitation’ of a basin as a basis for computing and 
allocating the ‘utilizable flows of a river’ has simply no precedence even among 
riparian states who endorsed the drainage basin concept. 
In this light, during the CFA negotiations, whether the ‘Nile’ should be 
conceived synonymously with ‘drainage basin’ or be regarded as a ‘system of 
water bodies’, constituted a key point of contention. A counter-proponent, 
Ethiopia struggled against the discourse influenced by the ‘drainage basin’ 
conception, among others, because of its clear geographical implication beyond 
the water bodies. On the other hand, while Egypt’s wider formulation which 
endeavored to include the basin’s whole precipitation into the region’s 
governance structure received no backing, its argument that the CFA’s physical 
scope of regulation extends over the ‘river basin’ was nonetheless supported by 
several states – both upstream and downstream, and hence endorsed. 
Against such background, a perspective was adopted by the CFA that strove 
to take into account the specific concerns of Ethiopia, on the one hand, and most 
other riparian states, on the other. In unparalleled legal maneuver and thoughtful 
structure, Article 1 on the ‘scope of application of the CFA’ declared that the 
instrument shall apply to the ‘use, development, protection, conservation and 
management of Nile River Basin and its resources.’ Two distinct terms were, 
however, introduced in connection with the ‘geographical scope of application’ 
of the rules contained in the CFA –depending on the specific functions 
contemplated.  
Hence, Article 2(a) on the ‘use of terms’ provided the ‘Nile River Basin’ 
constitutes the ‘geographical area determined by the watershed limits of the Nile 
River System of waters’: this definition would be used only in connection with 
issues of ‘environmental protection, conservation or development.’ On the other 
hand, a second terminology, the ‘Nile River System’ was introduced which 
embodies ‘the Nile River and surface waters and ground waters which are 
related to Nile River’: this conception shall be used ‘where there is reference to 
utilization of water.’ This wording appears to be a slight approximation of the 
‘river ecosystem’ expression employed by the ILC during the drafting of the UN 
Watercourses Convention –to refer to ‘river streams’ as such and the waters they 
carry.     
                                                                                                            
   http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/11030/17/Questions-about-the-CFA-.aspx  
48 Tadesse Kassa Woldetsadik (2010), supra note 41, p.489. 
49 Ludwik A. Teclaf (1996), supra note 42, p.360.  
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Obviously, Ethiopia had strained to limit a wider connotation which the basin 
approach entails in relation to territorial sovereignty; if only in part, it had 
succeeded. Egypt’s previous argument to embrace ‘basin-wide precipitation’ 
within the ‘utilizable waters’ of a river over which the CFA’s regulations apply 
was not accepted.50 At least, in relation to issues of ‘utilization’ and ‘water 
resources subjected to regulation’, the CFA employed language so akin to the 
UN Watercourses Convention which handed ‘narrower’ intrusion to territorial 
sovereignty – a cause many upriver states had endeavored to uphold.  
All the same, the formulation could not disguise the really concerning issue. 
It is the ‘flowing waters’ confined in rivers and ground systems, and not the 
‘adjoining physical landscape’ extending over a basin that truly counts when it 
comes to disputes over transboundary waters. In this light, the regulatory 
expanse of both the UN Watercourses Convention and the CFA are but broad – 
limiting each basin state’s sovereign discretion with regard to the utilization of 
the main channels of the Nile, tributaries, as well as sub–tributaries, rivulets and 
groundwater systems availed throughout the basin – so long as they form part of 
a unitary whole.      
4.2  Water security: protecting prior uses and pre–existing treaty rights?   
The CFA’s preamble persuasively stressed the need for integrated management, 
sustainable development and harmonious utilization of the Nile waters. In so 
doing, the basin-wide legal platform has reproduced several foundational 
principles of international watercourses and environmental laws –including the 
right to equitable and reasonable utilization, the duty not to cause significant 
harm, and the obligation to protect the river basin and its ecosystem. In an 
unparalleled structuring of riparian rights under treaty regimes, the CFA also 
introduced a new concept, ‘water security’. 
The enclosure on water security under the CFA –primarily framed by the 
World Bank at later stages during the negotiations, stirred challenge from the 
outset, particularly from Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s fears focused on the concept’s 
implications, and no less, on the specific objectives which the clause intended to 
serve in upstream-downstream context. Such national disinclination seemed 
only justified; after years of dialogues, it was hardly logical to prop up a new 
                                           
50 Abu–Zeid admitted Egypt ‘had signaled its reservations on this point; when we talked 
about water–sharing and use, we referred to the Nile River Basin which means all the water 
in the basin, including the groundwater and rainfall. We were surprised…that in Article 
4(1) of the CFA text…the wording Nile River Basin was replaced by Nile River system or 
watercourse, which is very different.’ The change introduced implied that ‘instead of 
taking into account all the water that falls into the basin, the signed CFA was proposing to 
take only the water that runs in the river…a considerable reduction.’ Al Ahram Weekly (23 
April 2015), supra note 43. 
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stipulation that reinstates the debates on the status of ‘prior agreements’ and 
reestablishes their ‘legitimacy’, a matter which, from upstream perspective, had 
been regarded as a settled commission. Minister Mohamed Abu–Zaid, Egypt’s 
long-serving diplomat involved in the stretched discussions on the CFA, made 
no secret of the objectives of such initiative: ‘when the negotiations on the CFA 
started, the draft included a reference to the historical agreements and the 
countries did not agree to that; so we looked for an alternative solution and the 
water security concept was introduced.’51  
While it is clear that the NBI’s objectives transcend well beyond mere issues 
of ‘prior uses/rights’, such downstream salutation (but in name) to the ‘old legal 
regime’ had raised valid fears of barrier against prospective uses of the Nile in 
hydropower and irrigational schemes upstream. For Egypt and Sudan, on the 
other hand, the concept’s inclusion has a far-reaching connotation; water 
security was perceived as essential mechanism for preserving the water 
allocation regime forged under the 1929/59 Nile water treaties-accords which 
had not bestowed a commensurate  guarantee to future equitable rights of use of 
other states in the basin.  
At the start, the concept, floated on the negotiations table since as early as 
2005, drew attention and widespread support within the NBI. In fact, downriver 
states were able to marginalize Ethiopia’s resistance and obtain upstream 
backing for Egypt’s phraseology on the subject. The concept was therefore 
accommodated under the CFA against Ethiopia’s reluctance and substantive 
objections. But in time, Ethiopia was able to turn the tide after it requested for 
opportunity to study its contents, and later worked on a counter–proposal which 
altered Egypt’s submission, echoing a new framing along the lines now 
contained under the CFA. 
Perhaps, apart from the obvious intents of the clause, a more pressing 
question in connection with the introduction of the water security proviso 
involves what legal implications the concept procures in international legal 
relations and what added value it yields to the contemporary discourse on the 
Nile.  
Generally speaking, it could be submitted that the approach adopted by the 
Nile basin states demonstrates the increased credence being attached to water 
security paradigms under international watercourses law and water resources 
management regimes. There has already been a growing predisposition on the 
part of the international community to ‘achieve and sustain water security’ 
across communities. In fact, development threats associated with the provision 
of water security have been the focus of successive United Nations conventions 
since the UN Water Conference in Mar del Plata (1977) and the International 
                                           
51 Al Ahram Weekly (23 April 2015), supra note 47. 
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Conference on Water and the Environment in Dublin (1992); the subject was 
also addressed at the Ministerial Declaration of The Hague on Water Security in 
2000. In purely legal discourses, however, a ‘right to water security’ has 
scarcely evolved into a subject of concentrated consideration nor developed as 
normative standard, although a few researches had touched upon the subject in 
the recent–past.52 This complicates the task of establishing its place and import 
within riparian rights discourse traditionally premised on other, commonly–
recognized, principles of international watercourses law.53 
Substantively, Article 14 under the CFA states that that having due regard to 
the provisions of Articles 4 and 5 (on ‘equitable utilization’ and ‘no significant 
harm’), the Nile Basin States recognize the vital importance of water security to 
each of them, and that the cooperation, management and development of waters 
of the Nile River System will facilitate achievement of water security and other 
benefits. In this spirit, the Nile Basin States agree: 
(a)  To work together to ensure that all states achieve and sustain water 
security, and 
(b)  Not to significantly affect the water security of any other Nile Basin 
State.  
An Egyptian/Sudanese counter–proposal, later rejected by upriver states, craved 
to modify Article 14(b) so as to read that the states agree ‘not to adversely affect 
the water security and current uses and rights of any other Nile Basin state’. 
Noticeably, water security conveyed different meanings under both schemes. 
After fiery debates and consultations that spanned over several years, a clean 
text of Article 14 was only agreed upon in 2009 at the Extra–Ordinary Meeting 
of the Nile-COM in Kinshasa. During this phase, three alternative phraseologies 
were suggested and discussed to break the standoff: removing the whole part on 
Article 14, to reformulate the provision and continue negotiation on the subject, 
or deferring the issues raised under Article 14 to the machinery of the NRBC 
which shall handle the matter within six months of its establishment. As no 
consensus could be achieved at the end of the meeting, the last alternative was 
picked by the Nile-COM so that Article 14 was eventually noted as an annex to 
the main treaty body.  
No doubt, Article 14 brought a scarcely-utilized paradigm into the Nile basin 
legal discourse. Yet, the objectives which it intended to achieve remained 
unconvincing, to say the least, given how the concept has been composed under 
                                           
52 Tadesse Kassa Woldetsadik (2015), supra note 10, p. 650. 
53 Id., p.650, pp.650-651. 
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Article 2(f) of the CFA.54 To start with, the overall approach was not prompted 
by genuinely ‘legal’ considerations, and in the end, its inclusion failed to 
indicate any significant added-value in ‘defining’ riparian rights per se. This is 
particularly true in view of the fact that several well suited principles of 
international water law had been presented under various headings of the same 
legal instrument; indeed, the system of international watercourses law offers 
adequate mechanisms that could help in realizing the objectives set out under 
Article 2 –except that a self–defeating political aim was sought under the CFA 
from the outset.  
In their widely referred article, Wouters et al concluded ‘evolving 
international legal frameworks that govern transboundary water resources 
provide an appropriate platform for addressing water security concerns’. The 
authors rightly argued ‘the notions of equity, reasonableness, fairness and 
sustainability which are enshrined in the key principles of international water 
law properly reflect the core objectives of fair and effective management of the 
world’s shared water resources, and thus of the promotion of regional and global 
peace and security’.55  
In the Nile setting, the recourse to water security was simply implausible, if 
for anything else because of the effects it produced. Today, the whole process of 
the NBI in relation to the CFA has been jeopardized due to a disagreement over 
the framing of Article 14. Of course, it would be naive to submit that the NBI’s 
enterprise ‘failed’ wholly on account of the concept’s introduction within the 
CFA. Of no lesser significance was also that the basin states had aspired to 
accomplish different goals through the CFA’s machination. The political tact of 
the states in laboring on deliberate ambiguity was evident in the processes that 
eventually even the concept’s full enclosure did little to persuade either Egypt or 
Sudan to embrace the CFA in its present form. Both states looked for more than 
a simple declaration of ‘equal right of access’ to the Nile waters guaranteed 
under Article 2. In fact, a downstream counter-proposal on Article 14(b) of the 
CFA intended to dispense more than the conventional objectives of ‘water 
security’ restated in human development and international relations paradigms. 
                                           
54 It defines water security as entailing ‘the right of all Nile Basin states to reliable access to 
and use of the Nile River System for health, agriculture, livelihoods, production and 
environment’. 
55 Patricia Wouters, Vinogradov, S. and Magsig, B.O. (2008), ‘Water Security, Hydro-
solidarity and International Law: A River Runs Through It’, 19(1) Yearbook of 
International Environmental Law, p.98. 
The Nile Basin Initiative and the Comprehensive Framework Agreement…                       217 
 
 
If only fatefully, such approach mingled mere issues of ‘water rights’ and 
‘resource scarcity’ with broader agendas on ‘national and political security’.56  
In conclusion, both Egypt and Sudan failed to trust the CFA’s machinery and 
perceive that ‘downstream use regimes’ would be protected adequately under 
the cooperative scheme. This formal mindset handed severe blow to the NBI, 
brought the negotiations process back to where it started two decades ago, and 
ultimately led the CFA to the frozen state in which it found itself today.  
4.3  Notification concerning planned measures with possible ‘adverse 
effects’ 
The UN Watercourses Convention establishes a layered procedural framework 
for the ‘exchange of information’ and ‘notification of planned measures’ so that 
watercourse states trade pertinent information, consult with each other, and if 
necessary, negotiate on the possible effects of planned measures on the 
condition of transboundary rivers. Furthermore, the Convention provided 
detailed mechanisms that regulate the interaction between states when a planned 
measure which may entail ‘significant adverse effect’ upon another watercourse 
state is implemented, including its ‘timely notification’ which needs to be 
accompanied by technical data, information and any environmental impact 
assessment. 
The whole system on timely notification of planned measures is designed to 
reassure sovereign equality and establish equitable balance between the stakes 
of riparian states over shared watercourses and avoid problems that inherently 
obtrude in any ‘unilateral assessment’ of the effects of any state’s actions 
pursuing a planned measure. The procedure, ‘mostly’ applicable when the 
implementation of new projects may result in violation of Article 7 of the 
Convention (obligation not to cause significant harm), circumvents ‘disputes’ 
which new uses by a state may trigger in relation to the legitimate interests of 
other basin states. This is not to imply that a riparian state is proscribed from 
embarking on development programs that ‘significantly affect’ another state’s 
current utilization of the same resource –an issue resolved by studying the 
contested relationship between Articles 5 and 7 on ‘equitable utilization’ and the 
‘obligation not to cause harm’. Of course, under Article 5, a state’s right to 
equitable utilization is explicitly recognized; this entails that any ‘factual harm’ 
generated by a country, so long as such remains within equitable entitlement or 
                                           
56 Domestically, this was further complicated by Article 44 of the Egyptian Constitution 
adopted in 2014 which stated that the state commits to protecting the Nile River and 
maintaining Egypt’s historic rights thereto. 
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does not deprive another state of its equitable benefits, will not entail legal 
responsibility under international law.57  
Instead, the message under Article 12 of the Convention accentuates that 
even when a state predicates its action on a reading of equitable entitlement, it 
must entreat to the procedural mechanisms set forth on the notification of 
planned measures whenever such actions likely cause a ‘significant adverse 
effect’ on the condition of the river in another state. Hence, the affected state, 
which may have pre-existing uses or may embark on the implementation of 
planned uses in the future, would get the opportunity to evaluate the measures 
and communicate its inferences. 
In varying forms, the principle on notification of planned measures is 
extensively employed in regional and basin-wide agreements, declarations, and 
is furthermore referred to in the decisions of courts and tribunals.58 This does 
not, however, signify its status under customary international law is a wholly 
settled matter or that its contents are unambiguous. In the context of upstream-
downstream disputes, several sticking points linger: the nature of the obligation 
on ‘direct trading’ of data and information for purposes of ‘evaluation’ which 
some states are reluctant to undertake; the requirement that implementation of 
planned measures must be ‘suspended’ during six months following notification 
and possibly during negotiations –which, many states fear, undermines 
sovereignty; and the difficulty in arriving at equitable resolution through 
bilateral consultations and negotiations when a notified state ‘subjectively’ 
concludes that implementation of planned measures is inconsistent with the 
provisions of articles 5 or 7. In his critical essay, Borne concluded that while 
generally the Convention structured a preferential treatment to notified states 
and lacked balance in respect of the notifying states,59 for the most part, the 
basic requirements of exchange of information, notice, consultation and 
negotiation now form part of customary international law, whereas in others the 
ILC had engaged in the progressive development of the law.60 
                                           
57 For detailed readings adopted by the Special Rapporteurs of the International Law 
Commission (ILC) on the subject, see ILC, The law of non–navigational uses of 
international watercourses, draft articles and commentaries thereto adopted by the Drafting 
Committee on 2nd reading: articles 1–33, reproduced in Yearbook of International Law 
Commission (1994), vol.II (Part Two), para. 222, A/CN.4/L.493 and Add.1 [and 
Add.1/Corr.1] and 2, p.103.  
58 Id., p.112. 
59 Charles B. Borne (1992), ‘The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Law 
of International Watercourses: Principles and Panned Measures’, 3 Colo. J. of Int’l Envtl. 
L. & Pol’y’,  pp.68-69.  
60 Id., p.72.  
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Given such uncertainties in international law, it did not come as surprise that 
the discussions under the CFA were engrossed by similar conceptual contests. In 
the final phases, states across the world espoused diverse positions, generally 
based on their geographical positions in river basins. Ethiopia battled to dodge 
restatement of Article 12 of the UN Watercourses Convention under the CFA –
either wholly or in diluted form. In abstaining on the General Assembly’s 
resolution on the UN Watercourses Convention in 1997, Ethiopia was one of the 
few states who had registered objections: it argued ‘the text of the Convention 
… falls short of achieving the required balance, in particular in safeguarding the 
interests of upper riparian states…’; this, it submitted, was evident ‘in most of 
the provisions of the Convention, and particularly with regard to article 7 and 
part III of the Convention on planned measures which put an onerous burden on 
upper riparian States’ and were endorsed despite the ‘considerable opposition to 
part III and a number of amendments…suggested to create a balance’.61 
Clearly, under the CFA, the principle was diluted –especially in comparison 
to the comprehensive regulatory regime provided under the UN Watercourses 
Convention. While both principles, i.e. the ‘exchange of data and information’ 
and ‘planned measures’ were retained under the CFA, ‘information’ on planned 
programs in pursuance of Article 8 would be routed –not directly between the 
‘affecting’ and ‘affected’ states as such, but through the Nile River Basin 
Commission who shall make use of procedures developed in the future to pass 
decisions.62 The framing under the CFA also featured certain ‘restrictions’ 
which tended to bolster upriver positions. 
First, in providing that ‘the Nile River Basin states agree to exchange 
information through the NRBC’, no restriction was provided with regard to the 
‘substance’ of the measures subjected to notifications regime. The UN 
Watercourses Convention has structured a two-tiered system on planned 
measures: under Article 11, states are required to ‘exchange information and 
consult each other, and if necessary, negotiate on the possible effects of planned 
measures’. This wider formulation refers to ‘all’ measures –whether impacting 
the condition of an international watercourse in positive or negative ways. 
Under a narrower stipulation of Article 12, a watercourse state intending to 
implement planned measures is required to provide a timely notification to other 
watercourse states only if the action may have a significant adverse effect. 
In contrast, Article 8 of the CFA only spoke of agreement to ‘exchange 
information through the NRBC’; the provision does not state whether this 
entails a system for mandatory notification which each state ‘must’ embark 
                                           
61 United Nations General Assembly Press Release GA/9248; General Assembly Session 51 
Meeting 99 May 21, 1997,  Mr. Berhanemeskel Nega (Ethiopia). 
62  The Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (2010), Articles 7, 8. 
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upon before implementing planned measures. In fact, two crucial elements of 
the principle (relevant in resolving disputes and misunderstandings, 
‘consultation’ and ‘negotiation’ on the possible effects of planned measures), 
were omitted in what appears to be a well-considered undertaking during the 
negotiations process. This denotes that while the basin states are still required to 
exchange information on planned measures through the NRBC, no legal frame 
is instituted on the basis of which a notifying state engages in consultations and 
negotiations with the state potentially ‘affected’ by a planned measure –so as to 
be able to settle its equitable interests through joint mechanisms. Therefore, a 
state may embark on unilateral development programs on the Nile without 
engaging in consultations or negotiations, or even more, without securing 
consensus from other riparian states potentially affected by its actions. Under 
the CFA, its obligation is restricted to ‘exchanging information on planned 
measures’. Given the uneven water resources development setting in the basin, 
this furnishes greater legal leverage to upstream states who may involve in new 
water resource development schemes in the future. 
Yet, it could be submitted that the CFA’s scheme in relation to ‘exchange of 
information on planned measures’ serves no rational purpose unless it is ‘meant’ 
to involve all stakeholders in institutional process that assures each basin state’s 
equitable interest. The NRBC is not expected to undermine such principles 
recognized under customary international law –except when a treaty 
unambiguously provides to that effect. From a downstream perspective, 
therefore, a countering contention could be raised that in the future the NRBC 
would improvise on the procedural framework of Articles 12–19 of the UN 
Watercourses Convention in regulating the exchange of information on planned 
measures and the conduct of negotiations between a state implementing planned 
measures on the one hand, and others who may be affected by such actions. A 
challenge remains, though, that any regulatory framework applied by the NRBC 
must be agreed upon by all basin states beforehand. 
In the meantime, any misgiving which a ‘notified’ state in the Nile basin may 
have would be accommodated not through the employ of the elaborate 
procedures that comprise consultations and negotiations, but only within the 
context of the Commission’s powers under Article 24 that strive to establish 
‘equity’ in the utilization of the Nile. This power of the NRBC mainly involves 
drawing a ‘basin–wide framework’ complementing the principle of subsidiarity 
under Article 10, and instituting mechanisms for a thorough review of 
conflicting riparian schemes and for balancing interests on the basis of equitable 
considerations. 
Not surprisingly, the CFA’s stipulation on planned measures had been one of 
the most divisive subjects. The subject lingered on the negotiations table for 
years and no consensus was reached until the Nile-COM’s crucial meeting in 
Kigali in 2007. The basin states took different positions on the question of 
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whether a riparian state should be required to notify ‘all other basin states’ and 
‘receive’ a green light before commencing a project within their jurisdictions. 
Egypt presented its case on the basis of a model offered under Article 12 of the 
UN Watercourses Convention. At the outset, many upstream states appeared to 
sympathize with Egypt’s proposal, although the final wording failed to content 
Egypt’s expectations.  
Article 8 took its present, extremely condensed, form only in due course, 
mainly because of Ethiopia’s firm opposition. Ethiopia’s rejection of the 
principle, and later, a modest conciliation offered to accommodate it in ‘some 
form’ was predicated on fears of negative effect which its application may 
generate; if a system of notifications coined along Article 12 of the UN 
Convention is introduced, upriver projects would be blocked (or vetoed against) 
each time a basin–wide consent lacks, or at best, the proposals would be 
subjected to rigorous procedural processes hindering the implementation of 
pressing national development schemes on the Nile. Therefore Ethiopia 
campaigned to undermine the concept, deny it of any substantive import, or at 
the very least, delay its application –by requiring the establishment of the 
Commission for its operation. Ultimately, the compromise provided under the 
CFA, in line with the Nile-COM’s resolution in Rwanda’s capital Kigali, 
corresponded to Ethiopia’s position on the subject. 
During the Nile-COM’s meeting in 2007, Egypt grudgingly accepted the 
final resolution as a consensus stipulation; but it was obvious that Egypt, which 
had ever looked for an elaborate procedural framework, was not pleased by the 
process. In 2010, Minister Nasreddin Allam reasserted his country’s position 
adopted during the last round of the negotiations on the CFA, and reiterated 
Egypt would not sign the CFA before two vital conditions are met –one of 
which included ‘commitment to an early notification mechanism before the 
construction of any projects in upstream countries’.63 To assuage upstream 
irritation, Egypt drew on example from a previous experience in the basin in 
which Uganda ‘shared’ a proposal to construct the Bujagali hydro-power plant 
which, Egypt stated, was ‘studied’ and ‘sanctioned’ as it entailed no problem 
from a downstream perspective. In this light, and defying the reading under the 
CFA, Egypt insisted that a compulsory notifications clause should be placed 
under the treaty wherein a procedural mechanism for arriving at consensus is 
devised and agreed upon to evaluate and authorize the implementation of any 
projects on the Nile.  
 
 
                                           
63 Al Ahram Online (April 2010), supra note 20. 
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5. The NBI and the CFA: A Failing Enterprise? 
The transitional mechanism of the NBI should be credited for fulfilling a few 
vital components of its organizational mission –building an atmosphere of trust 
and dialogue among riparian states and for embedding a sense of growing 
conviction in a common destiny. Indeed, apart from its main undertaking on 
basin-wide legal framework and institutional setup, the NBI had worked on a 
range of programs –laying the foundation for the NRBC’s creation, expediting 
negotiations on the CFA, and designing and implementing water resource 
development and management programs on limited scales. These ‘subsidiary’ 
tasks have been pursued within the framework of one of the NBI’s core 
missions: ‘coordinating and facilitating transboundary water resources 
management and development’. This authority has been employed in three 
successive phases of institutional development: a ‘Confidence and Capacity 
Building Phase’, the ‘Institutional Strengthening Phase’, and lately, the 
‘Delivery Phase’.64  
Indeed, the NBI had labored on designing major thematic concentrations for 
the Shared Vision Program since July 1998; by 1999, the policy guides and 
preliminary list of priority projects were already identified. In December 2000, 
the draft final projects document was prepared, and the Shared Vision Program 
was formally adopted in 2001.65 Along with two investment-oriented Subsidiary 
Action Programs endorsed in 2002 for the Eastern Nile and the Equatorial Lakes 
regions, the NBI endeavored to discharge several undertakings. These included 
preparing investment projects; supporting member states to manage 
transboundary water resources within the context of integrated water resources 
management; carrying out analysis and scenarios on sustainable natural 
resources management and planning at basin, sub–basin and national levels; 
creating mechanisms for basin-wide exchange of information and notification 
on water resource development; reviewing multi-purpose development options 
for power generation, irrigation and sub-basin analysis of water resource 
development; and providing better understanding and management of climate 
change consequences.66 A few of these, albeit slowly, materialized into tangible 
development projects and the founding of investment portfolios on power, 
agriculture and basin management. Most were initiated and agreed upon at 
regional levels through the involvement of two sub-regional offices, the Eastern 
Nile Subsidiary Action Program (ENSAP) and the Nile Equatorial Lakes 
                                           
64 Nile Basin Initiative (Sept.2011), Nile News, A Quarterly Newsletter of the Nile Basin 
Initiative Vol.8, Issue 3. 
65 Nile Basin Initiative: Key Operational Milestones of the NBI (1998-2005).  
66 Nile Basin Initiative (Sept.2011), supra note 64. 
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Subsidiary Action Program (NESLAP), and were implemented either regionally 
or nationally (by states), depending on the nature of the projects. 
In a sluggish stride over the years, the NBI projects’ dossier thickened –
showcasing the gains of cooperative partnership.67 And yet, none of the action 
plans designated specific dates for delivery, this being contingent on numerous 
factors presented below. Serious challenges lingered in the provision of concrete 
results, hence distressing the institution’s overall accomplishments, influencing 
riparian views about its future, and prompting concerns relating to its 
effectiveness and sustainability.  
First, the NBI’s projects started to take shape only after 2000 –following 
several years-in-waiting, and even then, the actual implementation of projects 
was delayed indefinitely. The schemes, only a handful now in the 
implementations phase, have been regarded as manifestly insufficient –both in 
terms of their ‘scale’ and ‘significance’ in bringing about fast socio-economic 
developments to communities in the basin. After two decades of riparian 
partnerships and dialogues, the NBI ought to have evolved from a forum that 
nurtures cooperation and riparian confidence into a platform that conveys 
tangible outcomes. In participation, several states had looked for a meaningful 
transformation of the ‘inequitable patterns of use’ in the basin. Only a little 
changed in the status quo.  
Second, nearly all the NBI schemes concentrated on relatively less-pressing 
side-issues involving ‘watershed management’, ‘flood hazards, preparedness 
and early warning systems’, ‘small-scale hydropower and agricultural projects’, 
and ‘environmental protection’. Four factors, namely the provisional nature of 
the NBI’s organizational setup, inadequate funding, persistent problems relating 
to riparian mistrust, and the ‘unequal stakes’ and ‘priorities’ of basin states in 
the river’s development detracted the NBI from initiating meaningful (large–
scale) irrigational and hydro-power programs. While such ordering of low-key 
schemes suited the strategic interests of a few basin states in the cooperative 
                                           
67 By 2011, the NBI’s development portfolio comprised an irrigation and drainage scheme in 
Egypt and Ethiopia, the Ethio–Sudanese power transmission interconnection project, flood 
preparedness and early warning scheme for the region, regional transmission 
interconnection projects involving Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and DRC, watershed 
management projects in Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, fisheries project in Uganda and DRC, 
the Tana-Beles integrated water resources development in Ethiopia, and the Lake Victoria 
environmental management project.  Likewise, new projects and initiatives for water–
sector investment were set in motion in the subsequent years – comprising the Bugesera 
integrated water and irrigation project in Rwanda–Burundi, Phase II of the flood 
preparedness and early warning scheme across the basin, and the Rusumo Falls hydro–
electric and multipurpose project connecting Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi.  
  Nile Basin Initiative (June 2011), NBI Investment Projects, Quarterly Newsletter of the 
NBI, Vol.8, Issue 2. 
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enterprise, in others, it built deeper resentment over the regional platform –
questioning its capacity and suitability, and spurring, over time, an inward-
looking approach to river resources development programs at national levels.  
Third, the pace at which technical and fiscal resources have been marshalled 
to execute ‘agreed upon’ projects also remained far from satisfactory –raising 
doubts about the realization of the NBI’s development objectives within 
reasonable time-frame. True, the NBI had helped states in ‘prioritizing shared 
development opportunities’ and in ‘preparing and identifying their potential 
water-based development projects’ even under circumstances when consensus 
on feasible projects initiated at regional and sub–regional levels had been 
problematic. Yet, no practical measures were adopted for a longer period –
mainly due to a mismatch between the means and ends.  
Obtaining pre-investment finance for projects identified through the NBI’s 
action plans constituted a formidable challenge –particularly in relation to the 
Subsidiary Action Programs of the Eastern Nile. Partly, this failure could be 
attributed to the intergovernmental nature of such undertakings where political 
and financial commitments were difficult to garner, and in part, to the serious 
diplomatic dispute that bubbled in the post-2010 period involving Ethiopia and 
Egypt. Such developments overshadowed the NBI’s overall gains, leaving little 
doubt that in the long term the institution’s objectives will be debilitated if the 
current trajectory remains –with visceral effects on its competence in 
guaranteeing the equitable rights of ‘all’ the basin communities and in 
‘deterring’ unilateral measures that undermine the spirit of cooperation. 
Finally, and perhaps the most critical challenge accounting for the NBI’s less 
promising future as a collective institutional platform may be linked to the fate 
and current status of the CFA itself. For nearly two decades, negotiations 
pursued under the auspices of the NBI failed to realize one of the organization’s 
fundamental missions: a permanent legal and institutional framework 
‘acceptable’ by all states in the basin. The development leading to the adoption 
of the CFA, not yet in force six years since it was endorsed by the Nile–COM, 
was not only beset by multifaceted glitches discussed above, in the end, the 
enterprise also failed to mollify the ‘expectations’ of two key stake–holding 
states in the basin: Egypt and Sudan. In diplomatic niceties, Egypt and Sudan 
continued to recognize the equitable rights of each state; in practice, both states 
struggled to reconcile such a stance with the strict ‘hands off’ policy they 
uphold to preserve the security of prior appropriations of the Nile waters. This 
delivered hefty setback to the NBI’s single–most important undertaking – 
forcing riparian countries to continue cooperation under a ‘transitory’ 
institutional mechanism. 
Attended by domestic policy considerations and developmental drives, a 
‘less–yielding’ enterprise of the NBI also impelled Ethiopia, the largest provider 
of the Nile River’s flow regime, to fine–tune its conviction in the regional 
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initiative and direct its focus on unilateral schemes. The decision, in 2011, to 
engage in construction of the GERD, shortly after Egypt and Sudan suspended 
active involvement in the NBI, could be viewed as a case in point.68 
In the pre–2010 period, Ethiopia’s national policy focused on influencing 
riparian discourse within the NBI –so that upstream states’ long–held 
perceptions of injustice are remedied through the institution of permanent legal 
and organizational platform. While Ethiopia succeeded in rallying upriver 
countries over the CFA, Egypt and Sudan, the two key players (in terms of 
extended preexisting uses, count of population dependant on the resource and 
territorial stretches within the basin) refused to sign the treaty – practically 
rendering the framework (and possibly the NRBC) a ‘one-party’ undertaking of 
the ‘upstream bloc’.  
Again, about a year later, Ethiopia’s national development enterprise on the 
GERD started to generate extraordinary apprehension along the downstream 
Nile. In June 2013, the blow to any hopes of the CFA as comprehensive pact 
including Egypt came about following the unprecedented scales of diplomatic 
fallout and legal squabbling between Egypt and Ethiopia. While the states strove 
to mend the diplomatic fracture in the subsequent years, paradoxically, the new 
developmental minutia also heralded a fresh episode in the history of 
cooperation between the states of Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan – progressively 
altering the tense national temperaments featured in the past. While still clouded 
by deeper accounts of mistrust, the trilateral legal relationship of the ‘Eastern 
Nile River Basin States’ picked momentum after 2013 and continued to 
intensify – fleeting through succeeding chapters of twists, upturns and 
downturns. 
In specifics, the cooperative undertaking between the three countries was 
informed by the same fundamentals ensconced under the CFA. And yet, the 
process – working on multilayered issues of concern along political, legal and 
technical tracks – was pursued through the employ of a separate ‘legal frame’ 
and ‘institutional platform’ unrelated to the NBI itself. In fact, during the 
trilateral proceedings, the NBI machinery was effectively sidelined as 
institutional stakeholder – raising genuine concerns about the visions and 
sustainability of a ‘basin–wide’ cooperation. This is not, of course, to imply that 
sub–basin arrangements are prohibited or viewed as inconsistent with either the 
NBI or the CFA; it is rather to highlight that in the present circumstances, no 
effort had been exerted to ensure coherence between the purposes and activities 
pursued in ‘Eastern Nile’ and the overall schemes of the NBI or the CFA. The 
NBI was barely involved in the political, legal and technical discussions, nor 
                                           
68 Ethiopia argued that this is in the spirit of the CFA and extends a variety of benefits to 
lower riparian states. 
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engaged in facilitating dialogue or coordinating consultations on national 
programs of action on the Nile.69 Clearly, the institution was relegated –this also 
becoming increasingly evident from the minuscule roles it continued to play in 
relation to the resolution of disagreements over potentially contentious large–
scale water resource development schemes such as the GERD.  
The pursuit of issue–triggered collaboration at local levels of the Nile basin 
seemed to hamper the NBI’s status as a lead institution in the region. Not least, a 
fragmented discourse continues to impact the CFA indirectly, leaving Egypt and 
Sudan with little incentives to engage in its ratification –which, in turn, 
undermines the prospects for a basin–wide cooperation on the Nile.  
Conclusions 
In retrospect, it may be inferred that the basin-wide legal architecture in the Nile 
had been preordained to ‘fail’ from the outset. In upriver states and lower 
reaches of the river, the values, nationalist views and strategic designs that 
informed the decades–long negotiations process were fundamentally 
incompatible, to the say the least, and commonly attended by rigid domestic 
policy frames. Between riparian states, the incentives for collaboration 
anticipated different sets of economic, social and political payoffs –placing 
greater emphasis on narrower national interests, which, in the end, were found 
difficult to reconcile. 
However, riparian interests of the basin states are not wholly incompatible. In 
fact, the Nile basin states have no choice but to ensure that the NBI’s enterprise 
is concluded in an inclusive and equitable manner. Else, the alternatives would 
not only present a bleak future from the point of view of cooperation and 
integrated development of the resource, in the long term, they would also stifle 
the riparian states’ lasting riverine interests.  
Today, the impending ‘failure’ on the CFA presents the strongest threat to 
the NBI’s future. In part, the way forward must conceive of ‘re–orienting’ the 
diplomatic focus with a view to embracing Egypt and Sudan fully onboard the 
CFA. It is reassuring to note that Egypt and Sudan reestablished their position 
                                           
69 The NBI argued, though, that the successful direct negotiation among the three NBI 
Member States is a result of the culture of dialogue, mutual trust, joint consultation and 
deliberation the NBI has been promoting since its establishment. It considered ‘the NBI’s 
invitation to this historical event as a clear recognition by the three countries, of the NBI’s 
contribution in…facilitating cooperation on the use of the shared Nile Basin water 
resources among the Nile Basin countries…’.  
   Nile Basin Initiative (2015), ‘NBI congratulates Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan on signing the 
Agreement on Declaration of Principles on the GERD Project’,   
http://www.nilebasin.org/index.php/news/192-nbi-congratulates-egypt-ethiopia-and-sudan-
on-signing-the-agreement-on-declaration-of-principles-on-the-gerd-project  
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within the NBI – after decisions in 2010 to freeze participation in the process. 
But, ‘mere participation’ in the NBI’s routine forums whose roles have been 
increasingly questioned for lack of impact only fulfills certain, largely 
transitory, objectives. A lasting equitable interest of all states in the basin only 
lies in launching, without delay, a permanent and comprehensive legal 
mechanism. A prolonged NBI, deprived of clear direction and optimism to 
evolve into permanent platform, triggers riparian despair and eventually drives 
states to tune domestic policies along ‘unilateralism’ as means of securing 
equitable stakes. Hence, any legal intricacy involved in ‘post–adoption’ 
amendment of the CFA notwithstanding, the basin states should again labor in 
genuine diplomatic undertaking on the stumbling blocks postured under the 
CFA and toil on their formulation so as to furnish common ground. 
From downstream perspective, there is also obvious geographical rationale 
for seeking to secure one’s riverine calling within the NBI/CFA. In the absence 
of a comprehensive deal on equitable utilization, Egypt and Sudan will remain 
vulnerable to upstream abstractions of the Nile waters; for both states, it would 
be very difficult to forestall such threats just by marshaling the old legal chorus 
on ‘historical rights’. It is also evident that in the 21st century, a long-term 
security to the legitimate claims of downstream states could not be procured 
through political manipulation, diplomatic altercations or belligerent threats; any 
such sanctuary must be sought within the frame of comprehensive institutional 
platforms and integrated water resource development strategies framed through 
the involvement of all stake–holders.   
Noticeably, Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia have fairly succeeded in the search 
for ‘negotiated settlement’ of multifaceted issues that arose in the context of the 
GERD. But it must be noted that this ‘isolated’ cooperative mechanism seemed 
to work only because each state had been heavily invested in the last five years 
–instituting new legal procedures and acquiescently addressing the political, 
legal and technical snags related to the GERD on a case by case basis. One 
cannot be certain that the same ‘talking ambience’ and ‘positively perceived 
payoffs’ would prevail in each future riparian encounter instigated by upstream 
development of projects on the Nile. Not least, it is worth noting that Ethiopia’s 
repeated assurances –that the GERD is intended solely for purposes of hydro–
power, a non–consumptive utilization, and that the dam offers economic and 
environmental benefits to downstream states as well, had factored in the relative 
amicable solutions forged in relation to the lingering issues of dispute between 
the three states. 
Still, a fragmented approach to riparian cooperation, however enticing in the 
short–term because of its relative comfort in forming technical and political 
deals between a fewer players, may only undermine the larger benefits procured 
from basin-wide cooperation and integrated water resource developments. In the 
long range, such trajectory may fail to shield the downstream states’ water 
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security concerns; Ethiopia, the largest potential user in the coming decades, has 
already laid concrete plans to engage in more extensive utilization of the 
resource, and no doubt, other upriver states will follow suit. Such measures, 
whose scope may expand over time, would open the door for competitive uses 
over a scarce water resource, and in the absence of a cooperative agreement, to 
simmering tensions, diplomatic fallouts and even confrontation. 
Without doubt, unilateral pursuit of water control works in upstream Nile 
will generate increased uncertainty in relation to the interests of Egypt and 
Sudan. In this light, a more guarding approach would not be to labor on isolated 
negotiations with each upriver state carrying out projects in the basin, but to 
salvage the CFA’s institutional platform and engage in its process without 
placing unreasonable preconditions. True, the unique water security interests of 
the downstream states could not be discounted, but such vulnerability should not 
present a pretext for showcasing the ‘national wellbeing’ of Egypt or Sudan only 
in a context that sanctions full control of the Nile waters. Within the framework 
of existing initiatives, both states should demonstrate that their bloated concerns 
over ‘water security’ and ‘integrity of preexisting uses’ are not necessarily 
‘incompatible’ with the ‘equally sovereign rights’ of other basin states and their 
aspiration to engage in cooperative development of the river resources. 
Clearly, this could not be achieved without serious resolve on the part of all 
basin states, and no less, without looking into a wide–ranging political, cultural 
and economic partnership that set up complementary platforms other than the 
Nile and encourage integrated, rather than competitive control and utilization of 
the resource. Such functional setting creates conducive environment for the 
(re)allocation of beneficial uses, for conserving more waters through supply–
side management of resources lost in evaporation, evapo–transpiration and 
seepage, and for introducing virtual water trading schemes to offset deficits in 
water supplies. In such context, cooperation would not only epitomize securing 
equitable interests, it would also entail entrenching riparian confidence and 
enhancing common welfare through the implementation of programs that entail 
less harm to each other.                                                                                         ■ 
